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Introduction: three mysteries 
Corporate mergers, stagflation, and globalization are usually studied as separate 
phenomena, belonging to the fields of finance, economics, and international 
political economy, respectively. This chapter attempts to tie them together as 
integral facets of capital accumulation. 
Analyzed independently, all three phenomena appear problematic, even 
mysterious. Take mergers and acquisitions. These are now constantly in the news, 
and for a good reason. Over the past decade, their value reached unprecedented 
levels, surpassing for the first time in history that of newly created production 
capacity. Yet, despite their importance, mergers and acquisitions remain 
enigmatic. "Most mergers disappoint," writes Th  Economist, "so why do firms 
keep merging?" (Anonymous 1998). According to the textbooks, there is no clear 
answer. Corporate merger remains one of the "ten mysteries of finance," a riddle 
for which there are many partial explanations but no overall theory (Brealey et al. 
1992, ch. 36). 
Stagflation, although presently dormant, is equally embarrassing. Most main- 
stream economists believe that prices should increase when there is excess 
demand and overheating, but stagflation - a term coined by Samuelson (1 974) to 
denote the combination of slagnation and inj!?ahn - shows prices can also rise in 
the midst of unemployment and recession.' A similar difficulty arises with the oppo- 
site phenomenon of inflationless growth, such as the one experienced recently in 
the United States. The standard explanation rests on the disinflationary impact of 
accelerating productivity, although that scarcely solves the problem. The fact is 
that even faster efficiency gains have often failed to tame inflation in the past, so 
why is it that they succeed now? Frustrated, many economists seem to have finally 
thrown in the towel, suggesting that we now live in a "new economy" where the 
old rules simply no longer apply. 
And globalization, too, remains perplexing to some extent. Although theories 
here vary a great deal, most seem to assume that in the final analysis globalization 
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occurs because it is more efficient. Capitalist accumulators, goes the argument, 
are propelled by the dual need to cut costs and broaden markets; this is best 
achieved through integration; hence the relentless pressure toward globalization. 
There is, however, a little glitch in this logic. Somehow, intensifying trade and 
integrating production always seem to come together with various barriers, 
restrictions, and limitations. International political economists tend to analyze 
these as facets of statist protectionism, non-market reactions to market globalization. 
Yet one could equally well argue that such "protectionism" is in fact essential for 
accumulation, and that the logic of globalization therefore has to do not with 
efficiency per se, but with the control of efficiency for profitable ends. 
As it turns out, some of the mist surrounding these phenomena begins to 
dissipate when we examine them not in isolation but together, as interrelated 
facets of accumulation. The following section, building on the concept of differ- 
ential accumulation, outlines an alternative framework in which capital is under- 
stood as a strategic power institution. The section "Breadth and depth," articulates 
the various regimes of differential accumulation through which capital power is 
augmented, as well as sketching their broader societal implications. It identifies 
four distinct paths: green-field investment (external breadth), mergers and acqui- 
sitions (internal breadth), cost-cutting (internal depth), and stagnation (external 
depth). The remainder of the chapter develops and analyzes the interconnections 
between these regimes. The section "Green-field," looks at the conflicting effects 
on differential accumulation of green-field investment. The sections "Mergers 
and acquisitions," and "Amalgamation and globalization," examining a century 
of mergers and acquisitions in the United States, combine the logic of corporate 
restructuring, capitalist integration, and globalization. The sections "Cost-cutting" 
and "stagflation," explore the impact on differential accumulation of cost-cutting 
and stagflation, respectively. The final section ties up the analysis by presenting 
a tentative framework for understanding the pendulum of global accumulation 
and crisis. 
Differential accumulation 
This analysis is part of a larger joint investigation, by Shimshon Bichler and 
myself, into the nature and broader ramifications of "capital as power." The 
analysis builds on the concept of differential accumulation, with capital viewed as 
a strategic institution, a reflection of capitalist power over social reproduction.2 
Radical writers have long debated the relative significance for accumulation of 
"production" as opposed to "circulation" (for instance, Weeks 1981; Sherman 
1985). Classical Marxists, preoccupied with the labor process, prioritized the 
former, whereas Monopoly Capital theorists, stressing the structure of ownership, 
shifted some of the emphasis to the latter. Less attention, however, has been paid 
to the categories themselves. The main problem is that the very separation 
between production and circulation, evident as it was in Marx's time, is no longer 
clear-cut: services currently account for over 70 percent of economic activity, 
complex production is increasingly carried out by huge corporate coalitions 
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whose non-arm's-length transactions blur the meaning of market "circulation"; 
and alienation, expropriation, and capitalist power have long transcended the 
boundary of the factory, spilling over into consumption and into politics at large. 
Indeed, given that capitalist labor and capitalist ownership are two sides of the 
same coin, it is unclear why we need to prioritize one over the other to begin with. 
The concept of differential accumulation seeks to go beyond the "pduction- 
circulation" debate. It sees capital as inherently political. This in turn enables us to 
integrate into the analysis, in addition to production and consumption, diverse 
phenomena such as oligopolization, ideology, religion, the state, and military 
conflict, as well as mergers and acquisitions, stagflation, and globalization. Most 
importantly, such power processes are seen not as auxiliaries to an otherwise "pure" 
notion of capital, but rather as essential to its understanding f om the very start. 
Capital accumulation is of course one of the more problematic concepts of 
political economy (Robinson 1953-54; Harcourt 1972; Bliss 1975; Obrinsky 
1983). Although the issue cannot be resolved here, the thrust of the problem can 
be briefly outlined. The main difficulty, haunting both conservative and Marxist 
analyses, is excessive emphasis on "materialist" considerations. For the neoclassicists, 
capital is a tangible means of production measured in its own technical units. For 
Manrists, capital is not a physical thing but a dynamic socio-material transformation. 
Yet, when it comes to measurement, Marxists too resort to materialistic units of 
"dead labor." 
The problem, first identified by Thorstein Veblen and later articulated in the 
Cambridge Controversies, concerns the units of accumulation. Neoclassical the- 
ory has never been able to explain what these units are. Marxist theory measures 
capital in terms of "dead labor," yet, as Marx himself openly acknowledged, once 
production grows in complexity it becomes difficult if not impossible to identift 
labor contents, even on paper; they simply do not exist (for more, see Nitzan 1992, 
1998; Nitzan and Bichler 2000a). 
An alternative way to tackle the issue is to build on Veblen and treat capital as 
a strategic institution, related to but distinct from production as such. Seen from 
this perspective, the magnitude of capital, measured in relative monetary terms 
as elaborated later, is a qstallization of capitalist power to shape and reshape the process 
of social reproduction. Much as in Marx's scheme, this power is exerted over human 
beings, mediated through production for profit. But in contrast to Marx, who 
tried to construct such power from the bottom up based on intrinsic labor values, 
we look at it from the top down. 
On the face of it, capital appears as finance, and on4 fmance. In form, it is simply 
the present value of expected capitalist earnings. The contents of capital, however, 
are political in the widest sense of the term, and the reason is not hard to see. 
Capitalist earnings are connected to production but the links are complicated and 
highly nonlinear. Owners are interested not in production per se, but in its effect 
on their relative profit. And since "too much" production is by definition detri- 
mental to profit, it is clear that production alone -that is, without its surrounding 
power institutions - is too limited a basis for understanding profit and accumulation. 
More importantly, there are numerous institutions and processes that are linked 
to production remotely or not at all, yet bear heavily on profit and accumulation. 
Corporate collusion, patents, taxation, transfer pricing, racial discrimination, the 
molding of consumer "wants," brainwashing, entertainment, armed conflict, 
and so on and on - all have an impact on profit. And once such effects are 
"discoun&" into asset prices, they become facets of capital. 
In other words, capital embodies, or crystallizes power that emanates not only 
from the relations of production but also from the entire spectrum of social power 
in capitalism. This broader perspective suggests that a bottom-up analysis of 
capital, based on what Marx called the production base, is potentially too limited. 
A top-down approach, which incorporates from the very start all forms of power 
affecting profit, is possibly more revealing. 
Strictly speaking, capitalists exert their power over society as a whole, so one 
whose profit amounts to one-hundredth of the total can be said to control 1 percent 
of the entire capitalist process. But such power is relevant only in relation to that 
of other capitalists. The real challenge is not to exert power as such, but to hold 
and expand it against other contenders. In a developed capitalist context, this 
boils down to "beating the average." And indeed, modern investors rarely if ever 
seek to "maximize" profit. Their ultimate goal is not absolute accumulation, but 
d~ment ia l  accumulation: having their profit rise faster than the average so as to 
make their distributive share bigger and bigger.3 
The reason, again, is not hard to see. Like all other forms of power, capitalist 
power is also based on exclusion. Unlike other forms of power, though, the 
dynamics of capitalism - particularly the "natural right of investment" - require 
capitalists to exclude not only workers but also most other capitalists from access- 
ing their sources of profit; failure to do so implies not only the shrinking of their 
own share, but also glut and the possible disappearance of profit altogether. In 
this sense, capitalist power is necessarily two-dimensional: imposing it on society 
both assumes and implies a pecking order among capitalists themselves. 
In the same breath, one can also argue that the very purpose of capitalist 
enterprise, much as in Mumford's "mega machine," is to articulate, assemble, and 
operate such power arrangements in the first place (Mumford 1967, 1970; Nitzan 
1998). And if we are to believe Veblen and Braudel, this power quest is not at all 
new; it lies at the very essence of capitalism and has from the very beginning 
(Veblen 1904; 1923; Braudel 1985). 
The result is that capitalist power institutions, however different qualitatively, 
are always the same in one crucial respect. They all aim at, and are measured by, 
their relative outcome: the extent to which they generate differential accumulation. 
. - 
In this sense, capital is the highest form of commodification, the commodijication of 
power itself: 
Note that, as it stands, differential accumulation is not a deterministic law of 
motion. It does not have to happen. Our claim here is rather that, over time, the 
- - 
quest for differential accumulation grows into an increasingly central moment of 
capitalist development. That being said, there is no telling whether or not differ- 
ential accumulation will succeed, or how exactly it will unfold. As a power process, 
it involves purposeful action against opposition, so its outcome cannot possibly be 
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automatic. In contrast to neoclassical and some versions of Marxian economics, 
where unobservable concepts such as utility factor pductivity, labor value, and 
maximum profit are used to build ccclosed" deterministic models, the analysis of 
differentialaccumulation relies on an observable category - the rate of differential 
accumulation - in order to construct "open," contingent explanations. And, 
indeed; on its own, differential accumulation is a mere framework. Making it into 
a theory requires that we prioritize its various trajectories, explaining how and 
why they unfold, the circumstances under which they proceed or are held back, 
and their broader societal implications. The present essay is an attempt to explore 
some of these questions. 
Furthermore, there is no assumption here that the same p u p  of capitalists will 
dominate the process throughout. On the contrary, the very essence of differential 
accumulation is an intra-capitalist struggle simultaneously to restructure the 
pattern of social repduction as well as the grid of power (see for instance, 
Bichler 1994-95; Nitzan and Bichler 1996, 2001). The important point in this 
chapter, though, is the progressive differential p w t h  of big business as a whole, 
regardless of its particular composition. As George Onvell aptly put it, d i g  
group is a ruling group so long as it can nominate its successors. ... Who wields 
power is not important, provided that the hierarchical structure remains always 
the same" (Onvell 1948: 2 1 1, original emphasis). 
The centrality of differential accumulation brings to the forefront the process 
of corporate centr&olion. The first to emphasize this process was Marx (1909, vol. I, 
ch. XXV), although he never integrated it into his bottom-up theory of value and 
accumulation which relied heavily on the assumption of competition and the free 
movement of capital and labor. This limitation no longer applies in a topdown 
power theory of capital. If accumulation is to be understood differentially, its 
analysis should focus from the start not only on capital in the aggregate, but also - 
and indeed more so - on the large corporate groups of dmninant capital at the core 
of the process. The origin of these groups, the political-economic patterns of 
their evolution, the means by which they expand, the broader implications of 
their differential growth, and the limits and contradictions imposed on that 
growth, are central to our understanding of capitalist development in general and 
its current trajectory in particular> 
Breadth and depth 
How can dominant capital achieve differential accumulation? For the large 
corporation, the level of profit is the p d u c t  of the number of employees times 
the average profit per employee. The firm can therefore raise its profit in two ways 
The first, which we call "breadth," is to augment its organization by having more 
employees. The second, which we label "depth," is to make its existing organization 
a more effective appropriator so as to generate higher profit per employee. 
Applying the same logic at the differential level, the implication is that a large 
firm will accumulate differentially by (1) expanding its employment faster than the 
average, (2) raising its profit per employee faster than the average, or (3) some 
combination of the two.5 Each avenue - breadth or depth - can be further sub- 
divided into "internal" and "external" subroutes, thereby leading to a four-way 
taxonomy: 
Tnble 6.1 Regimes of differential accumulation 
-- - -- - 
Ex& zn&mal 
BmaaVh Green-field Mergers and acquisitions 
BPth Stagflation Cost-cutting 
1 External breadth: green-&?Id i n v e r m .  A firm can achieve differential accumu- 
lation by building new capacity and hiring new employees faster than the 
average. This method is labeled "external" since, from a societal perspective, 
it involves a net addition of employees.6 Its upper ceiling is the extent of 
proletarianization. The more immediate Limit comes through the negative 
impact it has on depth: "excessive" green-field growth creates a downward 
pressure on prices and hence on profit per employee. 
2 Zntenurl breadth: mergers and acquidims. Strictly speaking, internal breadth 
involves differential earnings growth through interfirm labor mobility. This 
can happen when a firm adds new capacity and employment against cutbacks 
elsewhere, although such movements relate more to kfubzal restructuring 
(labor mobility between sectors) than to the s& redistribution of firms (labor 
moving from small to large firms). The situation is different with corporate 
amalgamation via mergers and acquisitions where no new capacity is created. 
By taking over other companies, the firm inmases its own profit relative to the 
average (which is virtually unaltered). We call this route "internal" since it 
merely &tributes control wer exidng capacity and employment. Merger and 
acquisition activity is perhaps the most potent form of differential accumulation, 
serving to kill two birds with one stone: it directly increases differential breadth 
while indirectly helping to protect and possibly boost differential depth (dative 
pricing power). It is limited, however, both by the availability of takeover targets 
and by social, political, and technological barriers. 
3 Zntenurl depth: cost-cutting. The purpose is to cheapen production faster than 
the average, either through relative efficiency gains or by relatively larger 
reductions in input prices. It is "internal" in that it redistributes income 
shares wi th i  a given price. Although cost-cutting is relentlessly pursued by 
large firms (directly as well as indirectly through outsourcing), the diff~culty of 
both monopolizing new technology and controlling input prices suggests that 
the net effect is commonly to meet the average rather than to beat it. 
4 External depth: s t q j l d a m .  Our emphasis on stagflation rather than inflation is 
deliberate: contrary to conventional wisdom, inflation usually occurs with, 
and often necessitates, some slack. Now, for a single seller, higher prices 
commonly are more than offset by lost volume, but things are different for 
a coalition of sellers. Dominant capital, to the extent that it acts in concert, 
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can benefit from higher prices since, up to a point, the relative profit gains per 
unit outweigh the relative decline in v01ume.~ Of course, for this to become 
a continuous process (inflation rather than discrete price increases), other 
firms must join the spiral. Yet, since small companies have little political 
leverage and are usually unable to collude, the result is to redistribute income 
in favor of the bigger ones who can. We refer to this method as "external," 
since the redistribution occurs through a (pecuniary) expansion of the pie. 
What are the implications of this taxonomy? In addressing this question, it is 
important to distinguish the case of an individual large corporation from the 
broader analysis of dominant capital as a p u p .  A single firm may successfully 
combine different facets of breadth and depth. Not so for dominant capital as a 
whole. If we look at breadth and depth not as firm strategies, but as overall regimes 
(see Table 6.1), it quickly becomes apparent that conditions which are conducive 
to one often undermine the other. For the sake of brevity, we group our arguments 
here into eight related propositions. 
A.poSition 1. Undestood as broad regimes, breadth and depth tend to moue countercyclical4 
to one another. Breadth presupposes some measure of economic growth as well as 
relative political-economic stability. Depth, on the other hand, commonly implies 
restrictions, conflict, and stagflation. Although strictly speaking the two regimes 
are not mutually exclusive, they tend to "negate" one other, with more breadth 
associated with less depth, and vice versa. 
Aoposition 2. Of the h regimes, b r e d  is the path $ least renhnce. There are two 
reasons for this. First, it is usually more straightforward and less conflictual to 
expand one's organization than it is to engage in collusive increases in prices or in 
struggles over input costs. Second, breadth is relatively more stable and hence 
easier to extend and sustain, whereas depth, with its heightened social antagonism, 
is more vulnerable to backlash and quicker to spin out of control. 
Aoposition 3. h e r  the longer haul, mmgm and ucquin'ti0n.s tmd to rire relahe to green- 
f i k f  investment. While both routes can contribute to differential accumulation, as 
capitalism spreads geographically and dominant capital grows in importance, so 
does the threat of excess capacity Mergers and acquisitions alleviate the problem 
whereas green-field investment aggravates it.' The broader consequence of this 
shift is for chronic stagnation gradually to substitute for cyclical instability. 
Roposihin 4. The r e h e  givwth mergm and quin'ti0n.s is like4 to oscillate around 
ib uptrend. Corporate amalgamation involves major social restructuring and hence 
is bound to run into roadblocks. The result is a wave-like pattern with long periods 
of acceleration followed by shorter downturns. 
Reposition 5. The unde&g lo& oS mmgers and acquisitionr implies progressive '~alialYl" 
untfitation and, evenhcal~ global4ation. For amalgamation to run ahead of overall 
p w t h ,  dominant capital must successively break its "envelopes," spreading from 
the industry, to the sector, to the national economy, and ultimately to the world 
as a whole. In this sense, differential accumulation is a prime mover of spatial 
integration and globalization. 
Fropanantion 6. Cost-c&titg is not a real alimative to an a m a ~ a m a h  ll. &pressure to 
reduce cost is everprerent, but its efict is nune to meet thma beat the average. The principal 
reason is that productivity improvements are neither inherently related to corporate 
size nor easy to protect. Similarly, reductions in input prices are seldom proprietary 
and often spill over to other f m s .  
Aoposifion 7. A much mom potent response to &thing mergers and acpdiom is in-
immmes inpr$t ma+. This is ofien facilitated by previous corporate centralization, 
and although the process is inherently unstable and short-lived, it can generate 
very large differential gains. By its nature, though, such inflation is possible only 
through a vigilant limitation of production with the result that inflation appears 
as stagflation. 
Fr~position 8. Over the longer term, dflerential accumulation &ped pnma@y on mergers 
and acquisiticvu. In the shorter term, it can beru$tjom sharp s tq j lu t iona~  rrires. The main 
engine of differential accumulation is corporate amalgamation, which thrives on 
overall growth and the successive breakup of ownership "envelopes." Occasional 
discontinuities in the process, however, push dominant capital toward an alternative 
regime of stagflationary redistribution. The result is a pendulum-like oscillation 
between long periods of relative political-economic stability accompanied by 
economic growth and low inflation, and shorter periods of heightened conflict, 
stagnation, and inflation. 
A W e r  theoretical and historical analysis of these general propositions is too wide 
to be undertaken here. It is nonetheless possible to highlight their significance 
by a brief examination of the US experience wer the past century. While this 
experience is certainly unique to some extent, the leading role of the United 
States in general and of US firms in particular may offer insight into other cases 
as well as into the broader nature of capitalist development. Before starting our 
exploration, however, a word of caution. Although the United States offers the 
best historical data, these are not always suited for our disaggregate analysis, 
occasionally forcing us into rough approximations, roundabout estimates, and 
bare speculations. Our conclusions are therefore tentative, open to challenges, 
and invite fiuther research and discussion. 
Green-field growth 
Employment growth is a double-edged sword for dominant capital, directly aug- 
menting external breadth (differential employment per firm) while indirectly threat- 
ening external depth (differential pricing power). Consider first the direct impact. In 
general, overall employment growth augments the differential breadth of dominant 
capital, but the reason is largely due to the way it affects smaller firms. Luge 
companies react to overall growth mainly by increasing their employment ranks. 
Smaller companies respond by growing in number (through the b i  of new firms) 
as well as in size (by hiring more workers). This is important since newborn b, 
by their very nature, tend to be smaller than the average. The implication is that, 
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even if green-field growth is spread proportionately between dominant capital and 
the rest of the business universe, as long as some of this growth results in the birth 
of smaller firms, the net impact is to reduce average employment per firm, thus 
augmenting the differential breadth of dominant capital. 
The evolution of this process in the United States is illustrated in F i r e  6.1 
(series are rebased for comparison). The data show that since 1926, the number 
of corporations has risen 3.6 times faster than overall employment, causing aver- 
age employment per firm to drop by over 72 percent (note the logarithmic scale)? 
The process has not been even, however. During the two decades between the 
mid- 1920s and mid- 1940s, the number of firms remained relatively stable, first 
because of the great depression and subsequently due to Wodd War 11. Changes 
in overall employment were consequently reflected more or less M y  in the 
t ~ o g  scale 
Number of firms' 
Average employment 
per firm" 
Figure 6.1 US employment, number of firms, and employment per firm. 
Sources: US Internal Revenue S e ~ c e ;  US Department of Commerce through McGraw-Hi (online). 
Notes 
Corporations only based on the number of tax returns by active corporations. 
Nonagricultural private employment divided by the number of corporations. 
average size of firms that fell through the depression only to rise rapidly there- 
after. In the longer run, however, this proved an aberration. Capitalism is subject 
to strong centrifugal forces, one of which is the inability of business enterprise to 
control the overall number of actors on the scene. And indeed, after the War, the 
number of firms started multiplying again while their average size trended down. 
Since large-firm employment has increased over the sameperiod, we can safely 
conclude that overall employment growth boosted the differential breadth of 
dominant capital. 
The indirect impact, operating through depth, is more complex and harder to 
assess. On the one hand, the multiplicity of small firms keeps their profit per 
employee low, partly by precluding cooperation and pricing discretion, and partly 
by undermining collective political action. This bears positively on the differential 
depth of dominant capital. On the other hand, unruly growth in the number of 
small firms can quickly degenerate into excess capacity, threatening to unravel 
cooperation within dominant capital itself. The balance between these conflicting 
forces is difficult if not impossible to determine. 
In sum, green-field growth is no panacea for dominant capital. Although the 
process boosts its ditXerential breadth, it has an indeterminate, and possibly nega- 
tive effect on differential depth. The main way of counteracting this latter threat 
is through corporate amalgamation, to which we turn now. 
Mergers and acquisitions 
Our discussion in this section begins with Figure 6.2. In this figure we plot a "buy- 
to-build" indicator, which expresses the dollar value of mergers and acquisitions 
as a percent of the dollar value of gross fixed investment. In terms of our own 
categories, this index corresponds roughly to the ratio between internal and 
external breadth. (The data sources and method of computing this index are 
described in the Data Appendix.) 
The figure illustrates two important processes, one secular, the other cyclical. 
First, it shows that, over the long haul, mergers and acquisitions indeed tend to 
become more important relative to green-field investment (Proposition 3). At the 
end of the nineteenth century, money put into amalgamation amounted to less 
than 1 percent of green-field investment. A century later, the ratio is approaching 
200 percent, and rising The trend growth rate indicated in the figure suggests 
that, year in, year out, mergers and acquisitions grew roughly three percentage 
points faster than new capacity. 
Now, whereas employment associated with new capacity is added by small and 
large firms alike, amalgamation, almost by definition, increases mostly the 
employment ranks of dominant capital. The net effect of this trend, therefore, is 
a massive contribution to the differential accumulation of large firms.'0 The 
reasons for this tendency are not at all obvious. Why do firms decide to merge 
with, or take over other firms? Why has their urge to merge grown stronger over 
time? And what does it mean for the broader political economy? 
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Needless to say, corporate amalgamation is a real headache for mainstream 
economics, whose models commonly rely on the assumption of atomistic competi- 
tion. Marshall (1920) tried to solve the problem by arguing that firms, however 
large, are like trees in the forest: eventually they lose their vitality and die out in 
competition with younger, more vigorous successors. On its own, though, the 
forest analogy was not entirely persuasive, if only because incorporation made 
firms potentially perpetual. For the skeptics, therefore, Marshall had to offer an 
additional explanation. Even if large firms failed to die, he said, and instead grew 
into a corporate caste, the attendant social costs were still tolerable - first because 
such a caste tended to be benevolent and, second, because the costs were 
outweighed by the greater efficiency of large-scale business enterprise. 
The rigomus spin on this latter argument was put by Coase (1937), who stated that 
the size of firms was largely a matter of transaction costs. Interfirm transactions, 
120 cjromlhrm Nian 
he asserted, were the most efficient since they were subject to market discipline. 
Such transactions, however, were not free, and therefore made sense only if their 
efficiency gains exceeded the extra cost of carrying them through. Otherwise, 
they were better internalized as intra-firm activity. Using such calculus, one could 
then determine the proper "boundary" of the firm which, according to Coase, 
was set at the point where "the cost of organizing an extra transaction within the 
firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of 
an exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing in another firm" 
(Coase 1937: 96). 
The ideological leverage of this theory proved immense. It implied that if 
companies such as General Electric, Cisco, or Lucent decided to "internalize" 
their dealings with other firms by swallowing them up, then that must be socially 
efficient, and that their resulting size - no matter how big - was necessarily "optimal" 
(e.g Williamson 1985, 1986). In this way, the nonexistence of perfect competition 
was no longer an embarrassment for neoclassical theory. To the contrary, it was 
the market itsevwhich determined the right "balance" between the benefits of 
competition and corporate size and, what is more, the whole thing was achieved 
automatically, according to the eternal principles of marginalism. 
The argument is hard to refute, although that is by no means a blessing. The 
problem is that marginal transaction costs - much like marginal productivity and 
marginal utility - are unobservable so reality can never be shown as being at odds 
with the theory. For instance, one can use transaction costs to claim that the 
historical emergence of "internalized" command economies such as Nazi Germany 
or the Soviet Union means they were more efficient than their market predecessors. 
The obvious counterargument, which may well be true, is that these systems were 
imposed "from above," driven by a quest for power rather than efficiency. 
But then, can we not say the same thing about the development of oligopolistic 
capitalism?l 
In fact, if it were only for efficiency, corporations should have become smaller, 
not larger. According to Coase's theory, technical progress, particularly in informa- 
tion and communication, reduces transaction costs, making the market look 
- 
increasingly appealing and large corporations evermore cumbersome. Indeed, 
using this very logic Fukuyama (1999) recently announced the "death of the 
hierarchy," while advocates of the "E-Lance Economy" (as in freelance) argue 
that today's corporate behemoths are anomalous and will soon be replaced by 
small, "virtual" firms (Malone and Laubacher 1998). So far, though, these 
predictions seem hopelessly misplaced: amalgamation has not only continued but 
accelerated, including in the socalled "high-technology" sector where transactions 
costs supposedly fell the most. 
How can that be true? Why do firms give up the benefit of market transaction 
in pursuit of further, presumably more expensive internalization? Are they not 
interested in lower cost? The riddle can be solved by using Veblen7s distinction 
between "industry" and "business" (6. 1904). Improved technology can certainly 
reduce the minimum efficient scale (MES) of production, and indeed today's 
largest establishments (plants, head offices, etc.) are often smaller than they were 
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a hundred years ago. Firms, on the other hand, are business units, and since they 
can own many establishments, their boundaries need not depend on production 
as such. The real issue with corporate size is not efficiency but differential profit, 
and the key question therefore is whether amalgamation helps firms beat the 
average and, if so, how? 
The conventional wisdom here is that mergers and acquisitions are a disciplinary 
form of "corporate control." According to writers such as Manne (1965), Jensen 
and Ruback (1983), and Jensen (1987), managers are often subject to conflicting 
loyalties which may compromise their commitment to profit maximization. The 
threat of takeover puts them back in line, forcing them not only to improve 
efficiency but also to translate such efficiency into higher profit and rising share- 
holder value. 
This argument became popular during the 1980s, when the earnings yield on 
US equities fell below the yield on long-term bonds for the fust time since the 
1940s, giving corporate "raiders" the academic justification (if they needed one) 
for launching the most recent merger wave. The logic of the argument, however, 
was problematic. Mergers may indeed be driven by profit, but that in itself has 
little to do with productivity gains. To begin with, there is not much evidence that 
mergers are either prompted by inefficiency, or that they make the combined 
firms more efficient (Ravenscraft and Scherer 1987; Caves 1989; Bhagat et al. 
1990). Indeed, as we argue later, the latent function of mergers in this regard is 
not to boost efficiency, but to fame it by keeping a lid on overall capacity growth. 
Moreover, there is no clear indication that mergers make amalgamated firms 
more profitable than they were separately, although here the issue is somewhat 
more complicated. 
First, there is a serious methodological difficulty. Most attempts to test the effect 
of merger on profitability are based on comparing the performance of merged 
and non-merged companies (for instance, Ravenscraft 1987; Ravenscraft and 
Scherer 1989; Scherer and Ross 1990, ch. 5). While this method may offer some 
insight in the case of individual firms, it is misleading when applied to dominant 
capital as a whole. Looking at the amalgamation process in its entirety, the issue 
is not how it compares with "doing nothing" (i.e. with not amalgamating), but 
rather how it contrasts with the alternative strategy of green-field investment. 
Unfortunately, such a comparison is impossible to make since the very purpose 
of mergers and acquisitions is to avoid creating new capacity. In other words, 
amalgamation removes the main evidence against which we can assess its success. 
Perhaps a better, albeit unscientific, way to tackle the issue is to answer the 
following hypothetical question: What would have happened to the profitability of 
dominant capital in the United States if, instead of splitting its investment one- 
third for green-field and two-thirds for mergers and acquisitions, it had plowed it 
all back into new capacity? As Veblen (1923: 373) correctly predicted, such a "free 
run of production" is not going to happen, so we cannot know for sure. But the 
very fact that it has not happened, together with the century-long tendency of 
moving in the opposite direction - from green-field to amalgamation - already 
sbggest what the answer may be.I2 
The second important point concerns the meaning of "profitability" in this 
context. Conventional measures such as the earnings-teprice ratio, return on 
equity, or profit margin on sales, relevant as they may be for investors, are too nar- 
row as indicators of mpuhtpourer when such power is vested in and exercised by 
corporations rather than individuals. A more appropriate measure for this power 
is the distribution and differential growth of profit, and from this perspective 
mergers and acquisitions make a very big difference. 
By fusing previously distinct earning streams,  ama at ion & to the orgmryed 
pourer of domYrant cajnhl, regardless of whether or not it augments conventional 
rates of return. In our view, this "earning fusion," common to all mergers, is also 
their ultimate goal. And indeed, by gradually shaing its emphasis from building 
to buying, corporate capitalism has so far been able not only to lessen the desta- 
bilizing impact of green-field cycles pointed out by Marx, but also to reproduce 
and consolidate on an ever-growing scale instead of collapsing under its own 
weight. The broader consequence of this s h a  has been creeping stagnation 
(Proposition 3), yet, as Veblen suggested, the large accumulators have learned to 
"manage" this stagnation for their own ends.I3 
Now, this general rationale for merger does not in itself explain the concrete 
historical trajectory of corporate amalgamation. Mergers and acquisitions grow 
but not smoothly and, indeed, the second feature evident in Figure 6.2 is the cyclical 
pattern of the series (Proposition 4). Over the past century, we can identify four 
amalgamation "waves." The first wave, occurring during the tmnsition from the 
nineteenth to the twentieth century, is commonly referred to as the "monopoly" 
wave. The second, lasting through much of the 1920s, is known as the "oligopoly" 
wave. The third, building up during the late 1950s and 1960s, is nicknamed the 
"conglomerate" wave. The fourth wave, beginning in the early 1980s, does not yet 
have a popular title but, based on its all-encompassing nature, we can safely label 
it the "global" wave. 
This wave-like pattern remains something of a mystery. Why do mergers and 
acquisitions have a pattern at all? Why are they not erratic, or alternatively, why 
do they not proceed smoothly? So far, most attempts to answer these questions 
have approached the issue from the micro perspective of the firm, which is 
precisely why they usually run into a dead end. 
One of the more famous explanations is based on Tobin and Brainard (1 968, 
1977). The basic claim is simple: if green-field capacity is cheaper, a firm wiU 
build it from scratch; if existing capacity is cheaper, the firm wiU buy it from 
others. Extending this logic to the economy as a whole, we should therefore expect 
the buy-tebuild ratio to be inversely correlated with the ratio of market value to 
replacement cost, now known as %bin's the less expensive existing assets are 
relative to new ones, the greater the proportion of "financial" to "real" investment, 
and vice versa. 
This logic seems sensible except that, in reality, things happen to move the 
opposite way. Figure 6.3 depicts two series: our own buy-tebuild indicator, meas- 
uring mergers and acquisitions as a percent of gross fixed investment, and %birrs 
based on the ratio of market d u e  to net worth at replacement cost of nonfarm 
nonfinancial corporations (with series smoothed for easier comparison). 
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Figure 6.3 %bids Q? 
1,000 
Source: %bin's Q pertains to nonfann nonfinancial corporations, and is computed h m  Federal 
Reserve Board Flow of Funds data through McGraw-Hi (Online) (Flow of Funds codes: BS 103164003L 
for market value, and BL102090005L for net worth at replacement cost). For the buy-to-build indicator, 
see Data Appendix. 
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(Mergers and acquisitions as a percent of 
According to the figure, US capitalists seem to have gone out of their minds. 
instead of investing in what was cheap, they systematically werspent on the 
expensive! 
The picture looks anomalous but only because we are using neoclassical micro- 
economic logic to explain a complex power process. New capacity may indeed be 
cheap if you are the only one adding it. But if your competitors all do the same 
it is a Merent matter altogether. Under the latter circumstances, the threat of 
glut and falling profit makes buying existing assets much cheaper than it looks on 
paper. As we explain later, large firms understand this all too well and act accorci- 
ingly.14 In short, mergers and acquisitions, although pursued by individual firms, 
occur within a broader and ever-changing political economic context. It is only 
when making this restructuring process the center of our analysis that the general 





A highly interesting attempt in this direction was offered by Lebowitz (1985), 
who tried to derive the tendency toward Monopoly Capitalism from the very logic 
of Classical Marxism. According to Marx, argues Lebowitz, the essence of 
accumulation is the expropriation of means of production - initially h m  workers 
but ultimately also h m  other capitalists - until capital becomes One, a unitary 
amalgam held by a single capitalist or a single corporation. The road toward such 
amalgamation, he continues, proceeds through horizontal, vertical, and con- 
glomerate integration (although not necessarily following the stylized pattern in 
Figure 6.2). The key challenge is to show that all three phenomena are dumt in 
the inner logic of accumulation. To establish this link, Lebowitz begins by assum- 
ing, along with Marx, an intrinsic connection leading from productivity growth to 
accumulation. Next, he suggests that all three forms of integration increase effi- 
ciency and hence contribute to accumulation: horizontal integration creates 
economies of scale; vertical integration leads to more roundabout, or mechanized 
production runs; and conglomerate integration improves allocative efficiency 
through intersectoral capital mobility To constrain any of these processes is there- 
fore to hinder accumulation and since, according to Marx, capital works to 
dismantle its own barriers, it follows that all three types of integration are 
inevitable, and that capitalism is destined to become monopolistic. 
Based on its own premises, the logic is undoubtedly elegant. The premises 
themselves, however, are partly incorrect as well as incomplete. The f i t  problem 
concerns production. As noted earlier and argued further in the section "Cost- 
cutting," beyond a certain point there is no necessary connection between industrial 
size and eficiency/profitability so complete productive integration cannot be 
traced to the inner logic of accumulation.15 The second problem is the absence 
of power. Even if greater industrial integration were always more efficient and 
profitable, that would still leave unexplained a prowing proportion of mergers 
which merely fuse ownership while leaving production lines separate. The 
difficulty is most clearly illustrated in the case of conglomerate integration: inter- 
sectoral capital movement can improve allocative eficiency only through green- 
field investment but, if so, why does conglomerate consolidation almost invariably 
take the route of merger? The answer, by now a bit tedious, is that business 
consolidation is not about efficiency but the control of eficiency for differential 
ends. While capital is forever trying to remove the barriers on its own accumulation, 
this very accumulation is inherently impossible without barriers beiig put on 
others, including on most other capitalists. The act of merger llfils both of these 
requirements, allowing investors to exercise their- to [imit. 
Seen from a differential accumulation perspective, amalgamation is a power 
process whose goal is to beat the average and redistribute control. Its main appeal 
to capitalists is that it contributes directly to differential breadth yet without 
undermining and sometimes boosting the potential for differential depth.16 Thus, 
everything else remaining the same, it makes more sense to buy than to build. But 
then everything else does not, and indeed c m t  remain the same. The reason is 
simple: amalgamation transforms the very conditions on which it is based.17 
Three particular transformations need noting here. F i t ,  amalgamation is akin 
to eating the goose that lays the golden eggs. By gobbhg up takeover targets 
within a given corporate universe, acquiring firms are depleting the pool of future 
targets. Unless this pool is somehow replenished, mergers and acquisitions eventually 
lead to a highly centralized structure in which dominant capital owns everything 
worth owning. From a certain point onward, the pace of amalgamation therefore 
has to decelerate. Although further amalgamation within dominant capital itself 
may be possible (large firms buying each other), the impact on the group's difler- 
ential accumulation relative to the average is negligible: by this stage, dominant 
capital has grown so big it ir the average. 
Second, green-field growth, by adding new employment and firms, works to 
replenish the takeover pool to some extent. But then, and this is the second point 
worth noting, since green-field growth tends to trail the pace of amalgamation in 
both employment volume and dollar value, its effect is mostly to slow down the 
depletion process, not stop it. Indeed, the very process of amalgamation, by 
directing resources away from green-field investment, has the countervailing 
impact of reducing growth and hence hastening the depletion process. Thus, 
sooner or later, dominant capital is bound to reach its "envelope," namely the 
boundaries of its own corporate universe with few or no takeover targets to 
speak OE'* 
Third, corporate amalgamation is often socially traumatic. It commonly 
involves massive dislocation as well as significant power realignments, and is 
ultimately limited by the speed at which the underlying organizations can adapt 
(this last point is emphasized by Penrose 1959). The consequence is that as amal- 
gamation builds up momentum, it also generates higher and higher roadblocks, 
contradictions, and counter force^.'^ Taken together, the depletion of takeover 
targets, the negative effect on growth associated with lower levels of green-field 
investment, and the emergence of counterforces, suggest that corporate amalga- 
mation cannot possibly run smoothly and continuously (Proposition 4). 
But then, why should amalgamation move in cycles? In other words, why does 
the uptrend resume after it stumbles? And what does this resumption mean? From 
the perspective of dominant capital, amalgamation is simply too important to 
give up. And while there may be not much worth absorbing in one's own corpo- 
rate universe, outs& of this universe targets are still plentifd. Of course, to take 
advantage of this broader pool dominant capital has to break through its original 
"envelope," which is precisely what happened as the United States moved from 
one wave to the other (Proposition 5). 
The first, "monopoly," wave marked the emergence of modern big business, 
with giant corporations forming within their own original ind&s. Once this 
source of amalgamation was more or less exhausted, further expansion meant 
that f m s  had to move outside their industry boundaries. Indeed, the following 
"oligopoly" wave saw the formation of vertically integrated combines whose 
control increasingly spanned entire sectors, such as petroleum, machinery, and food 
products, among others. The next phase opened the whole US corporate univcrse up 
for grabs. Firms crossed their original boundaries of specialization to form large 
conglomerates with business lines ranging from raw materials, through manufac- 
turing, to services and finance. Finally, once the national scene was more or less 
integrated, the main avenue for further expansion lay across international 
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borders, hence the recent global merger wave.20 So far, the global wave has been 
characterized by considerable de-conglomeration, with many f m s  refocusing on 
so-called "core activities" where they enjoy a leading profit position. The reason 
is that globalization enables additional intra-industry expansion across borders 
while legitimizing further domestic centralization in the name of "global com- 
petitiveness." Eventually, though, such refocusing is bound to become exhausted, 
pushing dominant capital back toward conglomeration, this time on a global 
scale. In fact, this is already happening in areas such as computing, communication, 
transportation, and entertainment, where technological change is rapidly blurring 
the lines between standard industrial clas~ifications.~' 
Indeed, the pivotal impact of mergers is to alter not the structure of production 
per se, but the broader stnutuse of power. The reason is rooted in the dialectical 
nature of amalgamation. By constantly pushing toward, and eventually breaking 
through their successive social "envelopes" - from the industry, to the sector, 
to the nation-state, to the world as a whole - mergers create a strong drive 
toward "jurisdictional integration," to use Olson's (1982) terminology. Yet this 
very integration pits dominant capital against new rivals under new circumstances, 
and so creates the need constantly to restructure power institutions, of which 
corporate amalgamation is itself an important dimension. Surprisingly, though, 
these power dynamics of mergers have drawn relatively little attention in an area 
where they seem to matter most, namely in the process of globalization. 
Amalgamation and globalization 
The gist of capitalist globalization is the spatial spread of accumulation, whose 
main vehicle is Ihe movement of capital.22 Most analyses of the process concentrate 
on its alleged cyclicality. The common view is that although capital flow has accel- 
erated since the 1980s, the increase is part of a broader recurring pattern whose 
peaks were in fact recorded during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century (Taylor 1996). The standard approach to these ups and downs in capital 
mobility is the so-called "Unholy Trinity" of international political economy. 
According to this framework, there is an inherent tradeoff between state swer- 
eignty, capital mobility, and international monetary stability, of which only two 
can coexist at any one time (Fleming 1962; Mundell 1963; Cohen 1993) .~~ Thus, 
during the "liberal" Gold Standard which lasted until World War I, limited state 
sovereignty allowed for both free capital mobility and international monetary 
stability; during the interwar period, the emergence of state autonomy along with 
unfettered capital flows served to upset this monetary stability; after World War 
11, the quasi-statist system of Bretton Woods put a check on capital mobility so as 
to allow domestic policy autonomy without compromising monetary stability; 
finally, since the 1970s, the rise of neoliberalism has again unleashed capital 
mobility, although it is still unclear which of the other two nodes of the Trinity - 
state swereignty or monetary stability - will have to go. 
Why has the world moved from liberalism, to instability, to statism, and back to 
(neo)liberalism? Is this some sort of inevitable cycle, or is there an underlying 
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historical process here which makes each "phase" hndamentally different? The 
answers vary widely.24 Liberal interpretations emphasize the secular impact of 
technology which constantly pushes toward freer trade and greater capital mobility 
with unfortunate setbacks created by government intervention and distortions. 
From this perspective, postwar statism, or "embedded liberalism" as it came to be 
known, was largely a historical aberration. After the war, governments took 
advantage of the temporary weakness of capitalism to impose all sorts of restric- 
tions and barriers. Eventually, however, the unstoppable advance of information 
and communication forced them to succumb, with the result being that the 
- 
rate of return rather than political whim once again governed the movement of 
capital. Critics of this "naturalcourse~f-things" theory tend to reverse its emphasis. 
Thus, according to Helleiner (1994), the key issue is neither the expansionary 
tendencies of technology and markets nor their impact on the propensity of capital 
to move, but rather the willingness of states to let such movements occur in the 
fust place. From this viewpoint, state regulation is not an aberration but rather the 
determining factor, which governments remain free to switch on and OK One of 
the reasons for such cyclical changes of heart, suggests Frieden (1988), is the shift- 
ing political economy of foreign debt. According to this view, during the Gold 
Standard, Britain became a "mature creditor," and was therefore interested in lib- 
eralization so that its debtors could have enough export earnings to senrice their 
foreign liabilities. The United States reached a similar position during the 1970s, 
and used its hegmonic power to reimpose liberalization for much the same rea- 
son. According to Goodman and Pauly (1 995), this second coming of liberalism 
was hrther facilitated by the desire of governments to retain the benefits of 
transnational production. The latter required that they open the door to trans- 
national financial intermediation, hence the dual rise of portfolio and foreign 
direct investment. 
Plus ga chaqe, plus c'estpareic? Perhaps, but only because much of this discussion 
focuses on the cyclicality of capital flow. As it turns out, this preoccupation, 
convenient as it may be for those skeptical of globalization, & not entirely 
warranted.25 Fist, although the pace of globalization as indicated by the ebb and 
flow of capital movement has indeed oscillated over time, its impact on the level 
of globalization tends to be cumulative (Magdoff 1969). Thus, while skeptics such 
as Doremus et al. (1998) are correct in pointing out that most companies are still 
more national than global, the rapid pace of globalization suggests that the 
situation may not stay that way for long.26 A second, related point is that most 
analyses of capital flows concentrate on net movements - namely, on the difference 
between inflow and outflow. This choice is inadequate and potentially misleading 
Capitalist integration and globalization can move both ways which means that the 
proper measure to use here is the p s s  flow - that is, the sum of inflow and 
outflow (Wallich 1984). The net and gross magnitudes are the same when capital 
goes in only one direction, either in or out of a country. But when the flow runs 
in both directions the numbers could be very different. This is clearly illustrated 
in Figure 6.4, which contrasts capital flow with gross fixed capital formation in the 
G7 countries. The figure shows that since the 1980s, the relative increase of gross 
F&re 6.4 G7 prink investment flows as a percent of gross futed capital formation. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, B&me of P e  St&rics and I- F d  Stafislics 
through McGraw-Hill (online). 
Note 
Series are expressed as three-year moving averages. Flows comprise direct and portfolio 
investment. Gross flows are computed as the sum of inflows and outflows Net flows are computed 
separately for each counhy as the difTerence between inflow and oufflow, and then converted into 
absolute values and aggregated. Each series denotes the ratio of o v e d  G7 flows to o v e d  G7 gross 
Gxed capital formation, both in $US. Data prior to 1977 pertain to Canada, Italy, United Kingdom 
and the United States only. 
private flows was both powerful and secular, whereas that of net flows was more 
limited and cyclical. As a result, by 1998, the value of gross flows reached 58 percent 
of green-field investment compared to only 14 percent for net flows.27 
Unfortunately, lack of historical data on gross capital movements makes it diffl- 
cult to compare current developments with conditions prevailing at the turn of 
the century. Nonetheless, the fact that the share of gross investment in GDP was 
generally higher than now, and that two-way capital flow is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, together serve to suggest that the current pace of globalization, let 
alone its level, may well be at an all-time high. 
The other common thread running through most analyses is that capital flow 
is largely a response to the more "primordial" forces of production and trade. To 
us, this is akin to putting the world on its head. The global movement of capital 
is ultimately a matter of ommhip and hence power (Nitzan and Bichler 1996; 
Robinson and Harris 2000). Note that, on its own, the act of foreign investment - 
whether portfolio or direct - consists of nothing more than the creation or 
alteration of ownership titles.28 Note further that the magnitude of such titles is 
equal to the present value of their expected future earnings. Now, since these 
earnings can fall as well as rise with output, and given the many "political" factors 
at play, it seems clear that cross-border capital flows reflect the restructuring not 
of global production, but of the global politi~s of production. 
One of the first to approach international capital mobility as a facet of owner- 
ship and power was Hymer (1960), who argued that firms would prefer foreign 
investment over export or licensing when such ownership conferred differential 
power, or "ownership advantage7' as it later came to be known. Based on this 
interpretation, the power of US-based foreign investors seems to have risen 
exponentially over the past half century, as is illustrated in F i  6.5. 
: Log scale 
Trend growth rate: 
2.8% per annum 
Trend growth rate: 
1.3% per annum 
(Exports as a percent of GDP) 
Figure 6.5 The globalization of U S  business: ownership versus trade. 
Source: U S  Department of Commem through McGraw-Hi (online). 
Note 
Series are shown as five-year moving averages. 
The figure presents two proxies for the globalization of US business. The first, 
measuring the share of exports in GDP, provides a rough indication of the 
contribution to overall profits of trade. The second, measuring the share of 
foreign operations in overall net corporate profit, approximates the significance 
of foreign as opposed to overall investment. Up until the 1950s, the relative 
contribution to profit of foreign assets was similar to that of exports (assuming 
domestic and export sales are equally profitable, so that the ratio of export to 
GDP corresponds to the ratio of export profit to overall profit). Since then, the 
importance for profits of foreign investment has grown roughly twice as fast as 
that of trade, reaching 2G25 percent of the total in recent years. The faster 
p w t h  of foreign profits may seem perplexing since, even with the recent resur- 
gence of capital mobility, US trade flows are still roughly three times larger than 
capital flows. But, unlike trade, investment tends to accumulate, eventually causing 
overseas earnings to outpace those coming from exports. 
This divergence serves to heighten the power underpinnings of trade liberal- 
ization. Advocates of global integration, following in the footsteps of Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo, tend to emphasize the central role of free trade. Unhindered 
exchange, they argue, is h major force underlying greater efliciency and lower 
prices. As it stands their claim may well be true. Indeed, this is one reason why 
dominant capital is often halthearted about indiscriminate deregulation, particduly 
when it allows competitors to undermine its differential margins. Yet, despite this 
threat, large firms continue to support freer trade and for a very good reason. For 
them, it is a means to something much more important, namely free investment - 
or more precisely, thejeedom to impose and commodfi power. 
Although diff~cult o ascertain with available data, the cumulative (albeit irreg- 
ular) buildup of international investment has probably contributed greatly to 
differential accumulation by US dominant capital. The reason is that whereas 
exports augment the profits of small as well as large firms, the bulk of foreign 
earnings go to the largest corporations. It is therefore the globalization of owner- 
ship, not trade, which is the real prize. While free trade could boost as well as 
undermine differential accumulation, free investment tends mostly to raise it. But 
then, since free investment can come only in the footsteps of liberalized trade, the 
latter is worth pursuing even at the cost of import competition and rising trade 
deficits. 
Foreign investment, Like any other investment, is always a matter of power. The 
nature of this power, however, has changed significantly over time. Until well into 
the second half of the nineteenth century, the rapid spatial expansion of capitalism 
enabled profitability to rise despite the pardel increase in the number of 
competitors (Veblen 1923, ch. 4; Josephson 1934; Hobsbawm 1975, chs 2-3; 
Arrighi et ai. 1999). As a result, there was a limited need for collusion and, indeed, 
most capital flows were relatively small podolio investments associated mainly 
with green-field expansion (Folkerts-Landau ei ai. 1997). Eventually, excess capacity 
started to appear, giving rise to the progressive shift from green-field to amalga- 
mation described in the previous section. Yet, for more than half a century the 
shift was mostly domestic, with mergers and acquisitions initially breaking 
through the various national "envelopes." It is only since the 1970s and 1980s that 
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the process started to become truly global and to change the character of capital 
flow. The need to exert control has gradually mwed the emphasis toward larger, 
"direct" foreign investment, while the threat of excess capacity pushed such 
investment away from green-field, with over 75 percent of the world total now 
taking the form of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development 2000: 117, figure N9).  From a power 
perspective, therefore, one could say that whereas during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries capital mobility was largely a "choice," by the end of the 
twentieth century it became more of a "necessity," mandated by the combination 
of excess capacity and the cumulative buildup of giant firms, for which profitable 
expansion increasingly requires global amalgamation. 
In summary, there is a long but crucial link leading h m  capitalism, to differential 
accumulation, to amalgamation, to capital mobility (Proposition 5). From this 
perspective, the present process of globalization is inherent in capitalist develop- 
ment and therefore is not easily reversible without altering capitalism or moving 
away from it altogether. Moreover, contrary to popular perceptions, the under- 
lying force here is not greater efficiency but the control of efficiency, and the 
purpose is not aggregate but differential gain. Over time, and particularly since 
the 1980s, foreign investment has come to rely less on green-field and more on 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions, as firms increasingly break through their 
national "envelopes." The big winners are the large "distributional coalitions" of 
dominant capital. Society as a whole suffers as the emphasis progressively shifts 
from green-field to amalgamation, causing growth to recede and stagnation to 
creep in (Proposition 3). 
cost-cutting 
Although mergers and acquisitions are the most effective engine of differential 
accumulation, they are not always feasible (Proposition 4). When merger activity 
recedes, dominant capital has to resort to other means or risk differential kumula- 
tion. In principle, this can be done through either relative cost reduction (internal 
depth) or differential stagflation (external depth). In practice, the latter is much 
more effective (Propositions 6 and 7). 
Consider cost-cutting fist. The conflictual dynamics of capitalism, persistent 
even in the presence of oligopoly and monopoly, imply a constant pressure on 
fims to improve productivity and reduce input cost. This pressure, identitied by 
the classical economists and reiterated by all subsequent schools, radical as well as 
conservative, seems beyond dispute. From the perspective of differential accumu- 
lation, however, cutting cost is much like "running on empty." It helps dominant 
capital meet the average rather than beat it. 
This claim is dficult to test directly since data on productivity and input prices 
are rarely if ever broken down by firm size. The indirect evidence, though, seems to 
support our view here, if only provisionally (figures in this section are computed on 
the basis of data h m  F m ,  the US Internal Revenue Service, and the US Bureau 
of Labor Statistics). The logic is straighdorward: output per employee, taken as 
a broad measure of "productivity," is given by the ratio of sales per employee 
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divided by unit price (abstracting from inventory changes). Now, over the past half 
century, dollar sales per employee in large firms (the Fortune 500) have changed 
little relative to the comparable figure for the average firm: the ratio between 
them was 1.4 in 1954, fell gradually to 1.1 by 1969, and then rose ste*, reaching 
1.7 by 1993 (although the latter increase is probably overstated due to the growing 
significance of outsourcing by large firms). We can also reasonably assume that 
prices charged by larger firms have not fallen relative to those of smaller ones 
since, as we show in the next section, inflation has historically worked in their 
favor (direct evidence, though, is again unavailable). These conjectures, along 
with our above definition, imply that productivity gains by dominant capital have 
probably been roughly equal to the economy's average. 
The difficulty of achieving systematic differential cost-cutting is really not that 
surprising. First, even the largest firms have only limited control over their input 
prices, particularly given the proliferation of outsourcing, and when they do 
exercise such control, the benefits often spa over to other firms (a wage fieeze by 
dominant capital groups would empower smaller firms to do the same; political 
pressure on OPEC by car companies to reduce oil prices would benefit all energy 
users; an importer winning a tariff reduction gives competing importers a free 
ride, et~.).~'  Second, there is no inherent reason why large f m s  should be better 
than small ones at developing new production technologies. For instance, much of 
the recent advances in bio-technology, information, and communication have 
been driven by smaller companies, some with only a handfbl of workers. 
Dominant capital has often been unable to match this flurry of innovation, in 
many cases finding it cheaper to let smaller companies incur the R&D cost and 
then buying the more promising startups, sometimes just to keep their technology 
from spreading too quickly.30 Finally, production techniques, by virtue of their 
integrated societul nature, are notoriously diff~cult to monopolize. Unlike new 
products which could often be protected through patents, copyrights, and other 
threats, improvements in the social organization of production tend to proliferate 
easily, undermining the initial advantage of whoever implemented them first. 
Stagflation 
Unlike c'ost-cutting, stagflation is a highly effective means of differential accumu- 
lation. At first sight, this statement seems strange. How could large firms benefit 
from a crisis of rising prices, stagnating output, and falling employment? And if 
stagflation is indeed so "accumulation friendly," why does it not continue indefi- 
nitely? A fuller analysis of these questions is beyond our scope here, but the 
general thrust of the argument can be briefly outlined (for more on this subject, 
see Nitzan 1992; Nitzan and Bichler 2000b). 
The impact on profit of raising prices and lowering volume is of course non- 
linear (think about the consequences for profit of moving along a downward- 
sloping demand curve). But r e c d  that our concern here is not prices but in@zhm. 
Furthermore, we are interested in the impact of idation not on profit but on 
dflerenfiul profit. These two qualifications make a big difference. In contrast to 
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mergers and acquisitions which are commonly pursued only by a subset of firms 
(the larger ones), a strategy of inflationary redistribution can succeed only within 
a broader inflationary context in which aU prices tend to rise. That being said, it 
is also true that inflation is never unXorm and hence never "neutral." Indeed, this 
is the whole point: inflation exists precisely because it redistributes. Paraphrasing 
Milton Friedman, we can safely state that "Inflation is always and everywhere 
a redistributional phenomenon." The key question is who benefits from such 
redistribution, and this cannot be answered $ priori. The essence of inflation is a 
comprehensive destabilization and restructuring of all market relations, and 
although there is good reason to expect the more powerful groups to come out on 
top, the identity of such groups cannot be determined up front. It can only be 
decided in hindsight based on the distributional outcome. 
In the case of the United States, this outcome, illustrated in Figure 6.6, leaves 
Little doubt as to who the winners are. The data in the figure contrast two series. 
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The first is the rate of inflation measured by the annual percent change in the 
wholesale price index. The second is the profit-peremployee ratio, computed by 
dividing profit per employee in the Fortune 500 group of companies by profit per 
employee for the economy as a whole. The latter index corresponds to our notion 
of differential depth. Its fluctuations measure the extent to which dominant 
capital - approximated here by the Fbrtune 500 - is able to raise its profit per 
employee faster than the average. 
As the figure shows, the success of dominant capital here has been tightly and 
positively correlated with the overall rate of inflati~n.~' In other words, higher 
rates of inflation have played into the hands of the big players, allowing them to 
raise their profit per unit of organization faster than their smaller counterparts. 
(Further analysis reported elsewhere suggests that the link between inflation and 
differential depth was positively related to firm size: the larger the firm, the 
greater and more systematic the differential gains from inflation. See Nitzan 
1992). But if' the figure shows that dominant capital clearly benefited from infla- 
tion, it also suggests that this benefit was always short-lived, lasting only as long as 
the underlying bout of inflation. Indeed, the only way to keep such gains coming 
is to keep inflation going; and if' the gains are to rise, inflation must accelerate. 
Although such increases occasionally happen, and often with the desired 
impact on differential accumulation, they cannot last indefmitely As is illustrated 
repeatedly throughout history and across the world, inflation is a risky business. It 
is difficult to 'Lmanage," often degenerating into an uncontrollable spiral whose 
consequences - for differential accumulation and, more broadly, for the structure 
of capitalist power as a whole - are diff~cult o predict. 
For this reason, inflation is more of a stopgap option for dominant capital. In 
contrast to breadth, whose differential impact is slower to develop, the differential 
gains from inflation, which has no upper "technical" limit, are potentially huge. 
These gains, however, come with considerable risks which, under normal cir- 
cumstances, are deemed too high. It is only when the gains from breadth dry up 
that dominant capital, seeing its differential accumulation undermined, moves 
reluctantly toward relying on inflationary redistribution. This connection 
between inflation and power cannot be overstated. Mainstream theory, built on 
a belief in competitive markets, insists that inflation and growth should go hand- 
h ~ - h a n d . ~ ~  This belief is usually based on a cyclical argument about supply con- 
straints which, valid or not, is meaningful only in the short term. Over the longer 
haul, capacity can be increased as needed r e n d e ~ g  material bottlenecks largely 
irrelevant. 
The real key then becomes power. Since production provides no "natural" 
bottlenecks, these have to be created institutionally, through collusive and other 
arrangements among the key players. Regardless of their particular form, the 
purpose of all such arrangements is to keep overall capacity from growing too 
fast. The emphasis here on overall capacity is crucial; dominant capital may be 
able to keep its own production stable or even growing, but unless it manages to 
cap werall growth, coordination is likely to disintegrate into a price war, leading 
to disinflation or even outright deflation. 
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The upshot is simple: over the longer haul we should expect inflation and 
growth to be inverseb related. Long-term growth, far from stoking the inflation Gre, 
works to cool it off by undermining collusion. Inflation, on the other hand, 
requires slack and therefore tends to appear as stagflation. Before testing this 
proposition, however, it should be noted that the term "stagflation" has more than 
one interpretation. The "weak" version (see Samuelson 1974: 801) views stagfla- 
tion as inflation together with unemployment and capacity underutilization. The 
"moderate" version (found for instance in Baumol el al. 1986: 83), defines it as 
inflation combined with slow growth or recession. Finally, the "strong" version 
(adopted, for example, by F'arkin and Bade 1986: 6 18), limits stagflation only to 
instances in which inflation occurs with falling output. For our purpose here, the 
"weak" version is not very interesting: twentieth-century capitalism has been 
characterized by some measure of unemployment and unused capacity through- 
out so inflation was inMliably stagflationary according to this definition. The 
"strong" version also is not very helpful since falling overall output is relatively 
rare. The most useful of the three is the "moderate" version, particularly when 
understood as a relationship. If growth is positively related to inflation, stagflation 
is clearly an anomaly If, on the other hand, the relationship is negative, stagfla- 
tion must be seen as a "normal" phenomenon, intenslfying as growth declines and 
inflation rises and receding when growth increases and inflation falls. 
As it turns out, the long-term relationship is almost inMliably negative. Indeed, 
the evidence on this is nothing short of overwhelming (although systematically 
ignored by most economists). Figures 6.7 and 6.8 illustrate respectively the case of 
the United States over the past century or so, and of the industrialized countries 
since the late 1960s. The data contrast inflation and growth, both smoothed as 
twenty-year moving averages to accentuate their long-term pattern. The overall 
relationship in both figures is clearly inverse. The same long-term pattern seems 
to repeat itself in numerous individual countries, both developed and developing. 
The negative long-term correlation between growth and inflation also helps 
explain the postwar schizophrenia of policy makers in capitalist countries. Their 
frequently stated, eternal purpose is to promote growth and assure price stability. 
Their unstated commitment, though, has progressively drifted in favor of 
differential accumulation. During breadth periods, the stated and latent goals are 
consistent, with high growth and low inflation allowing policy makers to do little 
and claim succei. The problem arises when differential accumulation moves into 
depth and the macroeconomic scene turns stagflationary. Then the two cornmit- 
ments clash and the winner is almost invariably dominant capital. Policy is 
tightened, presumably in order to rein in inflation, but the consequence is exactly 
the opposite: the economy slows, which is precisely what dominant capital needs 
in order to keep inflation going! 
Occasionally, policy tightening claims a big victory - for instance, during the 
early 1980s, when higher interest rates were eventually followed by disinflation. 
But was tighter policy here indeed the came of lower inflation? As illustrated in 
Figure 6.2, during the early 1980s dominant capital began shifting back to breadth 
with a new merger wave gathering momentum. Under these circumstances, both 
Real GDP (annual percent change) 
Flgvle 6.7 United States: long-term inflation and growth. 
Sources: US Deparhnent of Commerce through McGraw-Hill (online); US President (Annual). 
Note 
Series are shown as twenty-year moving averages. 
Industrial production (annual percent change) 
Figun 6.8 Industrialized countries: long-term inflation and growth. 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Intrmatiarol F d  Stntirtics through McGraw-Hill (online). 
Note 
Series are shown as twenty-year moving averages. 
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the need for inflation and the ability to coordinate it tend to decline. If this 
interpretation is correct, the real cause of disinflation was resumed breadth, 
with restrictive policy in fact keeping inflation higher than it would have been 
otherwise. 
Summing up, our analysis so far suggests that of the four paths to differential 
accumulation, the more important are internal breadth through mergers and 
acquisitions, and external depth via stagflation (Proposition 8). To wrap up the 
discussion, we now turn to examine the relationship between the two paths and 
what it may mean for the hture. 
Are w e  heading for global stadation? 
Figure 6.9 contrasts ow amalgamation index (the buy-to-build indicator), with a 
composite stagation proxy (both smoothed as five-year moving averages). The 
latter proxy is constructed first by expressing unemployment and inflation as 
percent deviations from their respective historical means, and then averaging the 
two series into a combined stagflation index. (The purpose of including both 
inflation and unemployment is to accentuate the broader crisis aspects of depth 
although the pattern would have been similar had we used inflation only.)33 
The figure highlights several interesting features. First, it suggests that, wer the 
long haul, mergers and acquisitions were indeed the path of least resistance 
(Proposition 2). Whereas staghtion moved sideways, oscillating around its own 
stable mean, mergers and acquisitions rose exponentially relative to green-field 
investment (note the logarithmic scale). 
Second, it shows that since the turn of the century, following the initial emergence 
of big business in the United States, internal breadth and external depth tended 
to mwe countercyclically, with temporary declines in the former "compensated" 
for by sharp increases in the latter (Propositions 1 and 8). This latter pattern is 
indeed quite remarkable, particularly since, as we have emphasized, differential 
accumulation does not have to happen and can as easily go into reverse. Yet, as 
the chart reveals, major declines in merger activity were almost invariably 
matched by intens-g stagflation, and when merger activity resumed stagflation 
promptly dropped. 
Significantly, this inverse correlation seems to have grown tighter over time, 
perhaps as a consequence of the ascendancy of dominant capital and differential 
ac~umulation.~~ During the last decade of the nineteenth century, when big 
business was just emerging, the two series still mwed in the same direction. This 
changed in the first decades of the twentieth century, and with dominant capital 
assuming the center stage, the relationship became clearly negative although still 
somewhat loose. From the 1930s onward, with differential accumulation becoming 
entrenched, the negative fit grew tighter and tighter. 
What are the implications of these patterns? First, they suggest that globalization, 
far from contributing to growth, is likely to further exacerbate stagnation and 
unemployment. Considering the increasing inclination of larger firms to buy 
! Log scale 
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(Unemployment plus inflation, righl) 
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Figure 6.9 Amalgamation and stagflation in the United States. 
Source: US Department of Commerce through McGraw-Hill (online), and sources listed in the Data 
Appendix. 
Note 
Series are shown as five-year moving aveqes (the fmt four observations cover adable  data only). 
Average of standaFdized unemployment and standardized GDP deflator intktion (percent deviations 
from mean). 
+* Mergers and acquisitions as a percent of gross fured capital formation. 
capacity rather than build it, and given that giant cross-border deals now make 
this tendency truly global, there is little reason to expect brisk growth ahead. If 
anyhng, the downward growth trend evident for much of the postwar period is 
likely to continue (Proposition 3). 
Second and equally important is the tendency of lulls in merger activity to 
trigger stagflation crises. If the logic elaborated in this chapter continues to hold, 
and assuming differential accumulation goes on, the end of the present merger 
wave should, like its predecessors, give rise to yet another stagflation crisis. This 
time, though, the crisis is likely to be different in both scope and duration. 
Contrary to previous crises whose extent was at least partly contained by national 
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borders, this one may turn out to be truly global in both origin and magnitude. 
Moreover, its resolution is likely to prove much more diff~cult. Previous crises were 
defused when dominant capital broke its "envelope," moving to acquire firms out- 
side its original universe. This time, there are no more "envelopes" to break. 
Dominant capital now makes the world its playing field. When this field no longer 
yields enough takeover targets, where can the l q e  companies go? And if, after 
this merger wave ends, there is indeed no new universe to conquer, what will bring 
stagflation to an end? 
As these lines are written this scenario may seem far-fetched. The global pool 
of takeover targets - including the privatization of state-owned firms and public 
services - remains vast. Moreover, half of the world's population still lives pretty 
much outside the capitalist fold. Their proletarianization promises plenty of new 
green-field investment, which will in turn continue to generate new takeover 
targets. Nonetheless, the analysis suggests that as dominant capital gets closer to 
its ultimate, global "envelope," capitalism will become increasingly prone to 
stagflation crises. The more immediate barrier on further global amalgamation 
will likely be regulatory or financial. In many sectors global amalgamation is 
approaching "antitrust thresholds" as they are now called, and in some of them - 
including information and telecommunications - it has already triggered 
regulatory intervention (Hargreaves et al. 2000; Pretzlii and Lewis 2000). Also, 
much of the current merger drive has been financed by a rising stock market. 
If and when the boom turns to bust, this too could bring amalgamation to 
a temporary halt. 
The ultimate barrier, however, is the contradiction inherent in a system built on 
ever-incremiq power. Over the past several centuries, this contradiction was 
obscured by the "horizontal" dimensions of markets - equal exchange, free 
opportunity, democracy, and growing output. Yet markets, important as they may 
be, are merely a mechanism of capitalism. The essence of capitalism is ditferential 
accumulation and the relative expansion of power. This contrast between means 
and end is crucial. Conceived merely as a market system, capitalism could hnction 
indefinitely, at least in principle. But as a social order built on uugmenting power, it 
is necessarily self-limiting and therefore finite. From this perspective, the key issue 
is not the level or rate of profit but its distribution: whereas the former can always 
be increased, no capitalist can ever own more than the entire profit pie. And so, 
if large companies continue to spend on amalgamation twice as much as they do 
on new capacity eventually - although we cannot say when - there will be nothing 
more for them to conquer. The resulting corporate oligarchy, reminiscent of Jack 
London's description in 7%e Ira Heel (1907), may be able to increase its profit but 
not its relative power. Differential accumulation can &integrate at any time. At that 
point, however, it mast come to an end, and with it capitalism as we know it. 
Epilogue (August 2002) 
Since this article was first published in early 2001, the "hype" surrounding the 
breadth phase has been punctured. The merger boom, having reached a historical 
peak, collapsed together with the stock market; the world entered a recession; and 
hopes for "peace dividends" in a high-tech global village have been dashed by 
low-tech terrorism, massive military "retaliations" and rising security budgets. Do 
these developments mark the beginning of a new depth phase? The answer is not 
yet clear. Some of the key ingredients of depth - specifically, stagnating produc- 
tion, political tension, and growing conflict - are clearly here. The main challenge 
for dominant capital, however, is to use these developments as a basis for infla- 
tionary redistribution, and that has not yet happened. Stagflation has recently 
resurfaced in certain peripheral countries such as Argentina and Israel. But it is 
only when such stagflation takes hold of the developed countries that we can 
announce the dawn of a new depth regime. 
Data Appendix 
There are no systematic historical time series for mergers and acquisitions in the 
United States (other countries have even less). The series constructed in this chapter 
and plotted in Figures 6.2, 6.3, and 6.9, are computed on the basis of various 
studies, which often use different defdtions covering different universes of 
companies. 
The dollar values of mergers and acquisition for the 18951 9 19 period are 
taken from Nelson (1959, table 14: 37), whereas those covering the 192&29 
period come from Eis (1969), as reported in Histmid Sfuhtics of the ULIniLrI Sta&s 
(US Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census 1975, vol. 2, table 
V38-40: 914). Both data sets cover manufacturing and mining transactions 
only, and thus fail to reflect the parallel amalgamation drive in other sectors 
(Markham 1955). 
Data for the 193M6 period are from the US Federal Trade Commission, 
reported in Hishtical Sfuhtics of the United Sta&s (1975, vol. 2, table V38-40: 914). 
These data, again covering only manufacturing and mining, pertain to the 
number of transactions rather than their dollar value. Significantly, though, 
the number of mergers and acquisitions correlates closely with the value ratio of 
mergers and acquisitions to green-field investment during previous and subse- 
quent periods for which data on both are available (the 1920s and 196MOs). 
In our computations, we assumed a similar correlation to have existed during 
193M6 and hence used the former series (with proper re-basing) as a proxy for 
the latter ratio. 
From 1967 onward, we again use value data which this time cwer all sectors. 
Figures for 1967-79 are from W.T. Grimm, reported in Weston (1987, table 3.3: 44). 
For 198M3, data are from Securities Data Corporation, comprising transactions 
of over $1 million only The last series, covering the period from 1984 to the 
present and coming from the same source, consists of transactions of $5 million 
or more. The latter two data sets are reported regularly in the US Department of 
Commerce's Sfuhtical Abstract of the UnM Sta&s (Annual). 
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In constructing our indicator for the ratio of mergers and acquisitions to gross 
fured investment, we divided, for each year, the dollar value of mergers and 
acquisitions by the corresponding dollar value of gross fured capital formation 
(taken from the Hirfurical Statistics of the United States (1 975)  and from various issues 
of the Statistical Abstraci of the United States). For the 1930-66 period, we spliced in 
the number of deals linked to prior and later value ratios. 
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Notes 
1 During the late 1970s, a new branch of macroeconomic theory emphasizing supply 
shocks claimed to have solved the mystery of stagflation by blaming it on ext~a-market 
forces such as wicked oil sheikhs and greedy labor unions (for instance, Blinder 1979; 
Bruno and Sachs 1985). By pushing up the cost of raw materials and labor, these 
"aliens" cause deficient supply (rather than excess demand), which in turn has the double 
impact of raising prices while lowering production. Such cost-push explanations 
are not entirely misguided, but they are rarely brought to their logical conclusion and 
are therefore necessarily partial. The problem is that neoclassicists consider profit to be 
a cost of production on a par with wages and rent. But if that is true, why is it possible 
to have a "wage shock" and an "oil shock" but not a "profit shock"? Another solution 
to the stagflation riddle is favored by the expectations school (cf. Phelps 1968; Lucas 
1972; Friedrnan 1976). It retums to Humeb classical dichotomy and argues that infla- 
tion is a "nominal" phenomenon, dependent exclusively on expectations and liquidity, 
and hence consistent with either stagnation or growth which are "real" phenomena. 
The problems with this latter theory are numerous, including the fact that its key 
explanatory variables - expectations and the "natural rate of unemployment" - 
cannot be observed directly and often end up being "determined" so to speak by the 
econometric fit (see Nitzan 1992). 
2 The political essence of capital is emphasized in Bichler (1986) and developed more 
f i y  in Bichler (1991). For the concept, implications, and applications of differential 
accumulation, see Nitzan (1992); Nitzan and Bichler (1995); Bichler and Nitzan 
(1 996a,b); Nitzan and Bichler (1996); Nitzan (1998); Nitzan and Bichler (2000a,b); and 
Nitzan and Bichler (200 1). 
3 Conventional theory celebrates the iron law of profit maximization, although it is not 
very clear why. For one, the concept holds little water in the real wodd. As Hall and 
Hitch (1939) showed more than half a century ago, few if any capitalists know what 
maximum ~rofit means or how to achieve it. and as manv studies before and since have 
suggested they instead use "markup pricing" to achieve a "target rate of return" (for 
instance, Brown 1924; Kaplan et al. 1 958; and Blair 1972). The marginalists could not 
accept this heresy. Led by Machlup (1946), they lashed back, arguing that regardless of 
what businessmen said, in the end m k u p  formulae were nothing more than 
real-world techniques for maximizing profit - although they themselves were still 
unable to show exactly what that "maximum" was (Robinson 1966. 78-9). Many 
theorists refuse to be bothered by such earthly debates but the situation is hardly 
better in the "higher world" of textbooks. As it turns out, maximum profit is indeed 
"workable" in the extreme cases of perfect competition and monopoly But then what 
about the entire range of "imperfections" between these (nonexistent) ideal types? The 
problem, fmt identified by Cournot (1838), is one of oligopolistic interdependence 
which, in its "unrestricted" form, makes maximum profit indeterminate even in the 
mind of the economist. Game theory has solved this problem a million times wer but 
only by assuming certain predetermined rules. Sadly, real f m  are free to ignore such 
rules, so the enigma of maximum profit remains. 
4 By focusing here on the corporation rather than its ultimate owners, we bypass the 
long debate on the separation of ownership from control Grst identified by Man and 
later intensified with the publication of Berle's and Means's 7he M o a h  Cmpmafia 
ond Riuatc (1932). The harsher critiques of the "separation thesis," such as 
Zeitlin (1974), contested its conclusions as beiig based on "pseudofacts." Control, 
they argued, has never truly been separated from ownership. Less hwtile critiques, 
like Baran and Sweezy (1966) and more recently Screpanti (1999), accepted that 
ownership is increasingly separate from control but maintain that this mekly turns 
the corporation into a more effective "profit machine." One way or the other, we 
concur with Veblen that the corporation itself, regardless of who m s  it, was 
historically necessary for the survival of capitalism. W~thout his institution, which for 
Marx signaled the imminent "abolition of capital as private property within the 
framework of capitalist production itself" (1909, vol. III: 516), the centrifugal forces 
of competition and excess capacity would have probably killed the bourgeois order 
long ago. Any analysis of capitalism must therefore have the corporation as a central 
building block. 
5 Strictly speaking, differential accumulation requires not a positive rate of growth but a 
positive difference between rates of growth. Dominant capital can therefore accumu- 
late differentially even with its own profit falling, provided that the average declines 
even faster. This understanding is assumed throughout the chapter. 
6 For any given f m .  men-field investment can of course draw on interfirm labor 
0 - . - 
mobility as well as on new employment. From an aggregate perspective, however, labor 
mwement between fvms is ~ r o ~ e r l v  classified as internal breadth. 
. .  
7 Corporate capitalism, although h a y s  conflictual, is rarely if ever competitive in the 
sense of fvms being "price-takers." The view taken here is that the very existence of 
p d t  presupposes power which normally requires some measure of both collusion and 
exclusion, tacit or otherwise (Nitzan 1998). The success of such collusion/exclusion is 
reflected, if only indirectly, in differential profit margins, or in what Kalecki (1943a) 
called the "degree of monopoly" (for alternative concepts of competition and their 
relation to profit, see Ochoa and Glick 1992). 
8 The notion of excess capacity, associated mainly with Monopoly Capital writers 
such as Kalecki (1971), Steindl (1952) and Baran and Sweezy (1966), is admittedly 
problematic. Here, we use it to denote the potential threat to prevailing p d t  margins 
from higher resource utilization. To illustrate, since World War II, US margins, 
measured by the combined p d t  and interest share of GDP, have been positively 
related to the rate of unemployment (Nitzan and Bichler 2000a, figure 2: 80). In this 
context, a move from higher to lower unemployment increases utilization and threatens 
margins. 
9 Our measurements here are not strictly consistent in that we contrast the number 
of corporations with overall nonagricultural private employment (which also 
includes proprietorships and partnerships), rather than with corporate employment 
only (for which data are not publicly available). Based on a comparison of revenue 
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data, and assuming these are roughly proportional to employment trends, 
corporate employment over the period has grown by 17 percent more than overall 
nonagriculture private employment. Correcting for this difference implies that 
average employment per corporation over the period has fallen by 67 percent, 
compared with 72 percent indicated in the chart. This bias is clearly too small to alter 
the overall picture. 
10 The effect on relative employment growth is probably somewhat smaller than what is 
implied by the dollar figures. Amalgamated companies often end up shedding some 
workers, and also merger and acquisition data include divestitures, which reduce rather 
than raise employment Correcting for these qualifications, however, would not likely 
alter the overall trend. 
I I Wr more on the contrast between power and efficiency arguments, see Knoedler (1 995). 
12 A glimpse into what such a "free run" might have looked like is offered by the 
recent experience of Japan, a country where the merger medicine for green-field is still 
socially prohibited: 'The underlying problem facing many Japanese companies," 
writes the lG~mccial Tm, "is that they have misallocated capital over a long 
period. Instead of regadmg it as a scarce resource to be used as efficiently as 
possible, they have pursued engineering excellence.. . . Japanese production lines 
are often models of automated efficiency, but less attention has been paid to whether 
the goods on them should be produced at all. Many companies have poured cash into 
project that will never generate a return above the cost of capital" (Abrahams and 
Harney 1999). 
13 Contmlled stagnation is also used as a stick against labor, contributing to the political 
supremacy of capital by preventing fill employment In the immediate postwar years, 
this goal was achieved mainly through what Kalecki (1943b) termed the "political busi- 
ness cycle," with governments propping up the economy, only to step on the brakes as 
soon as employment became "too high." In time, the mechanism was perfected into a 
fill-fledgd "political trend," as Steindl (1979) later called it, with tight neoliberal 
policies aimed at maintaining unemployment "naturally" high. On the surface 
such policies seem to sacrifice accumulation for the more primordial goal of keeping 
capitalists in the driver's seat, although in practice the loss is often more apparent than 
d. First, policy-induced stagnation shifts income h m  profit to interest, but does not 
necessarily undermine the overall income share of capital. Second, for dominant 
capital, redistribution from labor and smaller firms could more than compensate for 
the negative impact on profit of stunted growth. Finally and no less importantly, the 
greater "stability" associated with stagnation translates into falling risk premia and 
a corresponding rise in asset prices. 
14 In this context, %bin's Qturns from a cause to a consequence, with mergers and 
acquisitions driving up asset prices and therefore the ratio of market value to 
replacement cost. 
15 Economies of scale, impressive as they were in Marx's time, are not a timeless iron law, 
but rather are historically and technologically contingent. Diseconomies of scale can be 
just as important. There is no reason to believe that completely centralized planning, 
capitalist or otherwise, is most efficient. Also with regard to roundabout processes - 
longer production runs may be more efficient but only up to a point, beyond which 
they almost always run into organizational barriers. 
16 Note that the act of merger itself has no effect on depth. It works only indirectly, 
through increasing corporate centralization, and even that is merely a facilitating 
factor. Consolidation makes it easier for firms to collude but that does not imply that 
collusion will actually take place or that it will be effective. 
17 This is also why most macro studies of mergers and acquisitions, such as Mitchell and 
Mulheirn (1996), Weston et al (1998) or Winston (1998), are usually insufficient. 
Although they acknowledge the role of structural changes such as increased competition, 
technical change, and deregulation, they tend to treat them more as external "shocks" 
to which amalgamation is then a "response." 
18 A typical illustration of this process is provided by the food business. During the 1 980s, 
the sector went through rapid amalgamation. In 198 1, a f 1.9 billion merger between 
Nabisco and Standard Brands created Nabisco Brands, which then merged 
in a $4.9 billion deal with R.J. Reynolds to create RJR Nabisco. A few years 
later, KKR, which earlier had acquired Beatrice for $6.2 billion, paid f 30.6 L i o n  to 
take over RJR Nabisco in what was then the largest takeover on record. Elsewhere in 
the sector, Nestle took over Carnation (f 2.9 billion) and ELowntree (f 4.5 billion); Grand 
Mehupolitan acquired PiUsbury (f 5.7 billion) and Guinness (f 16 billion); Phiulp Morris 
bought General Foods ($5.7 billion) and Kraft ($13.4 billion); BCI Holdings took over 
some Beatrice divisions ($6.1 billion); and Rh6ne-Poulenc bought Hoechst ($21.9 
billion). By the end of the 1980s, the merger flurry had died down. Accodmg to 
a recent report in the F d  T i ,  food companies are very cheap, yet "shareholders 
have deserted food stocks .. . partly because of the absence of genuinely attractive 
acquisition targets" in an industry whose " b i s t  problem has been minimal sales 
growth." During the 1990s, there were a few more big transactions, such as the 
f 14.9 billion acquisition of Nabisco by Philip Morris, but these were mostly reshuffles 
of assets among the large players. The experience of reaching the "envelope" was 
aptly summarized by a Bestfood executive whose company had been taken over 
by Unilever: "I have been to Bentonville, Arkansas plome of Wal-Mart's head- 
quarters], and I would like to say that it is not the end of the world, but you can see it" 
(Edgeme-Johnson 2000). 
19 The effect of such counterforces can be dramatic. The 1933 GlassSteagall Act, for 
example, reversed an earlier diversification trend by US banks, preventing them h m  
owning nonfinancial corporations, a limitation which is only now relaxed. 
20 The process is of course hardly unique to the United States. For example, 
"Before [South Africa] started the progressive unwinding of exchange controls in 
1994," writes the Firrancial T'r, "Luge companies were prevented h m  expanding 
overseas. With capital trapped at hoke, t h h  gobbled up all available cokpani& 
in their industries before acquiring companies in other sectors and becoming 
conglomerates" (Plender and Mallet 2000). For analyses of differential accumulation, 
business consolidation, and globalization in South Africa and Israel, see Nitzan and 
Bichler 11996. 200 1). , , 
2 1 For instance, information, telecommunication and entertainment companies such as 
Cisco, Lucent, Microsoft, AOLTime Warner, NewsCorp, Hutchison, and Vivendi 
now increasingly integrate computing (hardware and s o h ) ,  services (consulting), 
infrashucture (cables and satellite), content (television, movies, music, and print pub- 
lishing) and communication (internet and telephony), while leisure firms like Carnival 
Cruise own shipping lines, resort hotels, airlines, and sports teams. Companies like 
General Electric and Philip Morris have never abandoned conglomeration and 
continue spreading in numerous directions. 
22 Globalization of course has other dimensions, but these are secondary to our 
purpose here. 
23 The rationale is based on the external account identihr between current and ca~ital , 
balances. If the international monetary system were to remain stable while states retain 
domestic sovereignty over exports and imports, capital movements must be conhulled 
in order to "accommodate" the resulting current account imbalances. In the absence 
of such capital conhuls, states would have to give up their policy autonomy or else the 
mismatch between the cumnt and capital balances would upset international monetary 
stability 
24 h r  views and m i e m ,  see Cerny (1993), Helleiner (1994), Sobd (1994), and Cohen (1996). 
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25 For more on the globalization debate, see Gordon (1988), Du Boff et al. (1997), 
Sivanandan and Wood (1997), Burbach and Robinson (1999), Hirst and Thompson 
(1999), Radice (1999), and Sutcliffe and Glyn (1999). 
26 According to the WosM Inuesh t  Report, the share of transnational production in world 
GDP has risen from 5.3 percent in 1982, to 6.6 in 1990, to 10.1 percent in 1999, while 
the average "transnatiomlity" of the world's top 100 transnational corporations 
increased to 54 percent in 1998, up from 51 percent in 1990 (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development 2000, table 1.1: 4 and table 111.2: 76). 
(UNCTAD's "Transnationality Index" is defmed as the average of the ratios of foreign 
to total assets, foreign to total sales, and foreign to total employment.) 
27 Note that the series in Figure 6.4 is based on quarterly data and therefore fails to reflect 
shorter "hot money" movements. Their inclusion would have further widened the dis- 
parity between gross and net flows. 
28 The popular perception that "direct" investment creates new productive capacity, in 
contrast to "portfolio" investment which is merely a paper transaction, is simply wrong. 
In fact, both are paper transactions whose only difference is relative size: investments 
worth more than 10 percent of the target company's equity are commonly classified as 
direct, whereas those worth less are considered portfolio. 
29 The challenge to differential accumulation of "universal" cost was summarized 
neatly by Andrew Grove, Chairman of Intel: "How do you build a company" he asks 
"when your buyers are infinitely knowledgeable and where your suppliers maintain a 
level playing field for your competitors? What remains your competitive differentiator 
or your source of value or whatever academic clichC you want to wrap around it?" 
(Byrne 2000). 
30 "Big American companies," writes The Economirt, "fear that innovation is the secret 
of success - and that they cannot innovate." Indeed, their "terror" is that "innovation 
seems to work best outside of them," with the result that "Much of today's 
merger boom is driven by a desperate search for new ideas," with trading in 
intangible assets reaching $100 billion in 1998, up from $15 billion in 1990 
(Anonymous 1999). "Nobody holds out for organic growth any more," declares 
Sir Richard Sykes, chairman of Glaxo SmithKline which in 1999 controlled 
7.3 percent of the world market for pharmaceuticals. According to a recent FinanGial 
h s  survey in which he is cited, the reason has little to do with "efficiency gains." 
Indeed, "Those wary of mergers argue there is no evidence of scale contributing 
to greater efficiency Ed Scolnick, chief scientist at Merck, found absolutely no corre- 
lation between the size and productivity of his company's research laboratories. 
The relative success of small biotechnology companies suggests that scale in research 
may even be a disadvantage." Of course, this is hardly a reason not to merge. As Jim 
Niedel of Glaxo points out in the same article, "doubling up" [via merger] allows 
companies to screen twice as many compounds, not to mention the resulting increase 
in "salespower" (Pilling 2000). In our terminology, it contributes to both internal 
breadth and external depth. 
31 Fortune stopped reporting aggregate employment after 1993, but the relationship in the 
figure is likely to have remained positive for the rest of the decade. Note that the 
profit-per-employee ratio is the product of the sales-per-employee ratio and 
the markup ratio (the latter being ratio between the net profit share of sales in the 
Fortune 500 and in the economy as a whole). Now, as indicated in the section "Cross- 
cutting," the sales-per-employee ratio remained fairly stationary throughout the period. 
The markup ratio, on the other hand, was positively and highly correlated with inflation 
throughout the 1954-98 period. Given the re1ati0nsh.i~ between these two series, the 
implication is that the correlation between inflation and profit-per-employee depicted 
in the figure also continued to be positive after 1993. 
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32 Supply-shock explanations of stagflation are in this sense outside the mainstream since 
they acknowledge, if only half-heartedly, the existence of market power. 
33 Inflation fluctuates much more than unemployment and therefore dominates the 
combined stagflation index. The correlation coefficient between the combined index 
and its inflation component, both expressed as five-year moving averages, is 0.93. 
34 The thirty-year moving correlation between the stagflation and amalgamation indices 
(with the latter expressed as deviations from trend) rose gradually from a negative 0.1 1 
in 1927 to a negative 0.9 in 1998. 
